A Single Currency for EuropeConsiderations for Workers

John Monks
The Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 marked the point when, finally, the penny -or should I say the Euro -dropped for many people in the UK, including a fair number of our leading politicians who should have been better informed about the strength of political will driving the project. There would be a single currency. Indeed, the exchange rates for the 11 initial participants were fixed on 1 January 1999, in advance of a three-year transition period at the end of which Euro notes and coins will have become the common tender for most European citizens.
Gordon Brown's historic parliamentary statement on EMU in October 1997 recognized that Britain's future is inevitably wrapped up with the success of the European project. It put preparations for the single currency top of the agenda, and he saw no constitutional obstacle to this. But its introduction would have to wait for a decision to be taken after the next General Election.
The delay is disappointing and there are real risks for Britain. We have a pretty dismal record of missing the European boat and, on EMU, history appears to be repeating itself. We may end up with the downsides of the single currency without the ability to take advantage of the benefits of membership.
At the institutional level, the wrangle in Luxembourg in December 1997 about UK participation in the Euro-X caucus of Euro-zone ministers which will form the embryo economic government of Europe does not bode well for Britain's leadership aspirations. At the time of writing the possibility of a UK seat on the Central Bank's governing body is still in the balance and will only be secured if there are some strong assurances that it will be taken up sooner rather than later.
The economic environment in which British business works is unlikely to be made any easier by the decision to delay. The international markets 185 see the Euro as a 'softer currency' than the D-mark. Britain in contrast, with its high short-term interest rates and its newly independent monetary committee, is attracting the world's hot money. The result has been an overvalued and volatile pound, with consequent knock on effects for jobs and exports. It is already possible to point to job losses that can be laid at the door of uncompetitive export prices.
We still hear the argument that a fixed exchange rate system would deprive the participating states the ability to devalue. This has to be taken seriously but it is not as straightforward as it seems. 1 It has to remembered that those countries which are in EMU will influence the exchange rates of the 'outs'. 2 Only nominal rates would be fixed under EMU, but for competitiveness what matters is the real exchange rate. Movements in the nominal rate do not always correspond with the real exchange rate. 3 Devaluation is not a painless process. People in the devaluing country might not like the fact that their incomes are lower than they would otherwise have been. It is the real economy that matters and no monetary fix, whether it be in terms of moving to a fixed rate system or moving to a floating rate system, can alter that fact.
The consequences of the Maastricht convergence criteria have to be considered. There is undoubtedly concern, not least in the minds of Europe's electors, that the application of policies designed to achieve the convergence criteria will damage the real economy. This is a serious argument, and the issue has been high on the TUC's agenda for some time.
A key issue for the 'outs' is whether they would, in practice, be able to follow a more lax fiscal policy. It seems likely that the pressure to reduce budget deficits would be even greater on the 'out' countries, and that those 'out' countries with a deficit above the 3 per cent figure would pay a heavy interest rate premium. This must be one of the reasons behind the desire of Spain, Portugal and Italy to be in the first wave.
It should also be borne in mind that any attempt by the UK to engage in competitive devaluation would attract heavy reactions against us irrespective of obligations under single market rules, and that in turn would undermine further our attractiveness for inward investment, which is already weakened by our non-participation in the first wave.
A second consideration is that the criteria are more flexible than the Euro-sceptics would have it. The budgetary criteria are written in a protocol to the Treaty as reference values and specifically allow for cyclical downturns. This element has featured strongly in the arguments put
